Political-Knowledge Regimes

Developing a new concept from the study of three changes in public policy during the government of Tabaré Vazquez in Uruguay (2005-2009)

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ABSTRACT

In the last few years, scholars have paid increasing attention to the study of contextual factors that shape the use of research in public policy in each country. The concept of Knowledge Regimes is one of the most significant recent contributions to this literature. This paper is a critique of this concept based on the study of three key policy change events during the Vázquez administration in Uruguay. Although this concept helps to characterize the supply of research, it does not take into account the characteristics of the demand from the political system. Based on this criticism, a new concept is developed.
Introduction

Each public policy is a world of its own, and each country a different universe. However, since there is no scientific knowledge without theory, several authors, concerned with creating order from the chaos of existing cases and using pioneer texts like Weir and Skocpol (1993) and Wilensky (1997) as their foundation, have argued that it is necessary to explore general tendencies about how research is used in public policy. As I argued a couple of years ago, it is necessary to progress in the study of political factors of a structural nature that influence the political dynamics of specialized knowledge (Garcé 2011).

It is not hard to see that there are important differences in the usage of research in public policy in different countries (Carden 2009). In some countries, experts have more power; in other, they have less. The political structures of some countries allow hierarchical and technocratic approximations to policymaking. In others, the density of the democratic fabric (the power of political parties and other social groups) makes the vertical and technocratic control of decision-making processes harder. Some political systems (as in Germany and Chile) show, throughout time, a high propensity to employ information and research results in public policy. Meanwhile, other countries’ experiences (like those of the United States and Uruguay) demonstrate that there can be important gaps between the worlds of research and decision-making.

Unlike other fields of political research in which specialists have built typologies (e.g. democratic regimes, forms of government, welfare regimes, policymaking) no one has proposed, to date, a typology for distinguishing countries according to the specific way in which they use research in policy. The main objective of this work is to move a step in this direction.

To this end, the first section of this paper presents and discusses a theoretical contribution that offers an excellent starting point: the Knowledge Regimes (KR) concept recently developed by Campbell and Pedersen (2011). Second, I analyze three changes in public policy in Uruguayan public policy in order to critique this concept. Finally, in the third section, we return to the theoretical discussion in order to move towards the construction of a new concept: Political-Knowledge Regimes (PKR).
1. Knowledge Regimes: a fundamental albeit insufficient conceptual contribution

The concept that most closely approximates what we are looking for is Knowledge Regimes, recently developed by Campbell and Pedersen (2011:6): “Knowledge regimes are the organizational and institutional machinery that generates data, research, policy recommendations and other ideas that influence public debate and policymaking”. This concept is very useful for distinguishing different ways of organizing what we could call, in simple terms, the “supply side” in the link between research and public policy.

According to Campbell and Pedersen, in order to define the KR of a country, one must study two structural variables: the type of policymaking regime and the variety of capitalism. The figure below synthesizes the logic of what they call the political economy of KR:

**Typology of Knowledge Regimes by Campbell and Pedersen**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of policymaking regime</th>
<th>Variety of Capitalism</th>
<th>Type of knowledge regime</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralised and closed</td>
<td>POLITICALLY-TEMPERED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(United Kingdom)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralised and open</td>
<td>STATIST-TECHNOCRATIC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(France)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET-ORIENTED</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(United States)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSENSUS-ORIENTED</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Germany)</td>
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These four types of KR present important differences between them in three dimensions, as can be seen in the next chart:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Research Units</th>
<th>Market-oriented</th>
<th>Consensus-</th>
<th>Politically-</th>
<th>Statist-</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political-Knowledge Regimes</strong></td>
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In order to propose hypotheses regarding what type of RU and Knowledge Production Process can be expected from each type of KR, the authors rely on just how much the variety of capitalism and the policymaking regime influence the characteristics of the market of ideas and of the RU. The underlying logic, in each case, is the following:

- **MARKET-ORIENTED KR**: In countries with a liberal economy and a decentralized policymaking regime (United States), there is an open and competitive marketplace of ideas. In order to influence policy, the policy process actors (especially interest groups) utilize specialized knowledge. The knowledge dynamic is adversarial.

- **CONSENSUS-ORIENTED KR**: In countries with coordinated capitalism and a centralized policymaking regime (Germany), the marketplace of ideas is less competitive. Therefore, even though decentralization encourages the existence of numerous RUs, few of them are dedicated to advocacy. The knowledge they produce is oriented toward consensus-building.
• **POLITICALLY-TEMPEPERED KR**: In countries with liberal capitalism and a centralized policymaking regime (United Kingdom), the marketplace of ideas is competitive but there are few opportunities for policy process actors to push their preferences and interests. This promotes the existence of relatively few RUs, both public and private, and the predominance of an adversarial dynamic between partisan bodies of knowledge.

• **STATIST-TECHNOCRATIC KR**: In countries with coordinated capitalism and a centralized policymaking regime (France), the marketplace of ideas is closed. This does not stimulate the existence of partisan RUs or those oriented towards advocacy. RUs established by the State and the production of neutral knowledge predominated.

The concept of KR represents a significant advance. It is particularly helpful in describing and explaining the characteristics of the offering of research available in each country. However, it does have some important limitations. First, by definition, it refers only to the supply side of research. Both the demand side of research and those institutions and actors that mediate between supply and demand are relegated to the background. Second, the concept is too closely tied to the nature of the economy. It is important to consider the respective roles of both the state and the market when studying specialized knowledge dynamics. However, the model’s emphasis on economic structure and its central actors (enterprises) results in political institutions and its key organizations (political parties) being put in second place. Third, KR is a very static concept. As its own authors recognize, it does not sufficiently allow for change in KR over time (Campbell and Pedersen 2011: 188-189).

These limitations call for the construction of a new concept, more focused on politics and less inspired by the economy, which will allow us to draw from all relevant dimensions of the political dynamics of research and not just on those related to the structures and actors that supply it. What we need is a concept that allows us to differentiate clearly between countries based on the extent and the specific way in which they use knowledge in public policy. None of the existing concepts are sufficient. Some, like KR, offer good approximations but do not quite hit the mark. The Political-Knowledge Regimes (PKR) concept, which will be developed in the final section of this document, refers to the entirety of institutions and actors that are involved in the production and use of information and research results in public policy in a particular country.
At this point, in order to further understand the limitations of the KR concept and begin building another one, more comprehensive and adapted to our needs, it is necessary to leave the deductive path and take the inductive one. Both the critique of existing concepts as well as the construction of new ones requires empirical evidence. As Gerring (2007) argued, in the same way large-N studies are appropriate for refuting hypotheses, case studies are particularly suited for moving forward in the construction of theory. Case studies are especially helpful for generating novel hypotheses describing causal relationships and building new concepts.  

This is why in the next section we analyze the role of specialized knowledge in three events of policy change that occurred during the presidency of Tabaré Vázquez (2005 – 2009) in Uruguay.

2. The Uruguayan case: three public policies during the Vázquez government

The presidency of Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2009) offers an especially interesting opportunity to study the characteristics of the political dynamics of social research in Uruguay because it had a broad reform agenda spanning very different areas. As this paper does not seek to detail any specific policy, but instead to give a general overview of the political dynamics of research in the country, it is best to examine policies from different sectors. Following this criterion, this paper analyzes three public policies from three completely different sectors. First we look at one of the administration’s most emblematic social policies: the Social Emergency Plan (PANES, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program) that was launched during the first year of Vázquez’s mandate. Second, we consider the creation of the National Agency for Research and Innovation (Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación), a decision that represents a fundamental milestone in the revamping of the country’s National Innovation System. Third and last, this paper reviews the failed attempt to sign a free trade agreement with the United States, one of the

1 Contemporary political science offers numerous examples of influential theories and concepts which stemmed from case studies. I shall mention only two examples: Lijphart developed a typology of democracies based on an in-depth study of the Netherlands and Guillermo O’Donnell built the authoritarian-bureaucratic state concept from a case study of Argentina.

2 A synthetic review of the Vázquez government can be read in Garcé (2010). In Mancebo and Narbondo (2010) one can read a more profound study of his main policies.
president’s most polemic decisions in terms of trade policy. Despite sharing some traits (such as the central role of the president in each case), the three processes involve different political actors and epistemic communities. That is why, even when it could be argued that this study leaves out important changes that happened in other sectors (like the institutional changes in the health sector or the tax reform), these three examples offer a reasonably accurate image of the relationship between research and public policy in Uruguay and thus allow us to develop a definition of the type of PKR prevalent in Uruguay.

This methodology, which privileges the study of change events, is partially inspired by Tussie (2009). According to her, studying changes in policy facilitates the visualization of the impact of research on public policy. “The choice of policy change is key to this work, as it emphasizes the capacity of research to modify a status quo and to catalyze the knowledge-based policy discussion to another level” (2009:2). In any case, the role of research is not restricted to the episodes in which change takes place, as Tussie seems to suggest. It can also be perfectly visible in frustrated attempts at reform. Instances of failure are as important in methodological terms as instances of success (Garcé 2011).

The same sequence is used to describe each one of the proposed change events. After an introduction, we apply the classical scheme formulated almost three decades ago by Kingdon (1984). According to this approach, change in public policy can only occur when three streams coincide: the problems stream, the policy stream, and the political stream. When this happens, a policy window generated, providing an opportunity for change. Kingdon, discussing the conventional rationalist approaches (which suggest that firstly problems are included in the agenda, then solutions are created and contrasted, and finally used by political actors), argues instead that the three streams are absolutely independent from each other. For example, it is possible that solutions at the technical level are available before the problem is part of the political agenda (they are “solutions that look for problems”). Following this scheme, this paper narrates how, in each case, the respective window was created (distinguishing between the three aforementioned streams), and summarizes the outcome of the event. Finally, we analyze how Campbell and Pedersen’ concept of KR helps to understand what happened, and how the event might contribute to the construction of a new concept.
2.1 The Conditional Transfer program

The PANES program has often been called the Vázquez administration’s flagship policy. It is the Uruguayan version of the CCT programs that have become so popular in Latin America. This is a typical case of policy diffusion. As we will see, president Vázquez was the principle actor behind this policy. He had to uphold a promise he had been making since 1999: to create an “Emergency Plan” to fight poverty and indigence. To this end, Vázquez created the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES). MIDES then rapidly built an alliance with the Universidad de la República (UDELAR).

2.1.a The problem, the alternative, the opportunity, and the outcome

Problems stream. In the mid-nineties, poverty was not a salient issue in Uruguayan politics. The country had managed to reconcile the fight against poverty with the structural adjustment programs that characterized this period. Although by 1995 the advances that had been made in fighting poverty beginning ten years earlier were reversed (UNDP 1999), the main social indicators only began to worsen by the beginning of the 21st century. With the turn of the century came the economic debacle and, with it, an extraordinary increase in unemployment (which climbed to around 20%) and poverty (which reached approximately 30%). Much academic research done during that time helped put poverty in general and child poverty in particular at the center of debate. The most visible research was done by IPES of the Universidad Católica under the direction of the sociologists Fernando Filgueira and Ruben Katzman. The Panorama de la Infancia y la Familia en Uruguay (Overview of Childhood and Family in Uruguay), a study published in 2001, had an extraordinary impact because revealed that more than half of children were born in poor households. The House of Representatives, echoing public alarm, created a Special Commission for the Study of the State of Poverty. From December 2001 onwards the situation became even more dramatic, with the beginning of the financial crisis that would culminate in the bank holiday of August 2002. At the same time, blaming for social problems multiplied. In August, in the middle of the financial failure, it

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emerged that some children of a Montevidean public school “were eating grass”.\(^4\) Poverty had truly become a problem for Uruguayan society.

**Policy stream.** This social emergency spurred debate about what institutions and public policies were best for fighting poverty. Both in and out of the legislature, conversation centered on whether or not it would be appropriate to establish a “social authority,” as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) had recommended. At the same time, the Frente Amplio (FA), the favorite political party for the upcoming elections, started to develop one of Tabaré Vázquez’s promises from his previous electoral campaign. In 1998 and 1999 the FA candidate had begun to speak of the need to create an Emergency Plan to fight poverty. Similar experiences and policy responses throughout the region facilitated the conversion of this campaign slogan into a concrete public policy. In all of Latin America, since the mid-nineties, with the pioneering experiences of Brazil and Mexico as models, governments from both right and left began to implement programs for their most vulnerable citizens. The defining feature of these programs is that they are based on monetary transfers to the poorest homes, contingent upon the heads of households fulfilling certain obligations. The conditional cash transfer programs quickly expanded throughout the region in a classic example of policy diffusion: by 2011 18 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had instituted CCT programs, benefitting 113 million people (19% of the population). The Brazilian experience (Bolsa Familia), initiated in 2003, was especially influential in Uruguay given the relationship between the FA and Brazil’s PT (the Partido dos Trabalhadores, or Workers’ Party). In 2004, with the help of institutions like FESUR and the World Bank, leaders and poverty specialists of the FA learned a great deal about many of these regional experiences.

**Political stream.** While Jorge Batlle was president (2000-2005) he did not consider it necessary to push for a CCT program. His priority was to get the economy back on track and to restructure the financial system. The opportunity for a paradigm change in poverty reduction policies came when the FA arrived in office. In other words, the electoral triumph of the FA in October of 2004 “aligned the stars”, to use Kingdon’s metaphor. As for any leftist party, equality is a

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\(^4\) See the article by Hugo Carro for BBC World, from Uruguay (Thursday 8th of August 2002): “Thousands of Uruguays (...) felt moved by the news that caused national shock: there is so much hunger in the country, that some children from School 128 were eating grass”. See:

central value of the FA. Vázquez, the President-elect, was thus obligated to put a very visible emphasis on the fight for equality. Dealing with the social emergency was a fundamental mandate for the new government.

**Outcome.** Once elected, Vázquez moved quickly. In order to fulfill his promises to go forward with the Emergency Plan, assign the Communist Party a place in the ministerial cabinet, and send a clear sign to the electorate that his government, unlike previous ones, would deal with social problems, the president decided to create the Ministry of Social Development. Two of UDELAR’s departments gave technical support to the new institution for the design and implementation of the plan.⁵ The Social Science Faculty undertook a census of poor homes in the country in order to collect accurate information, while the Institute of Economy (FCEyA) created a Critical Needs Index (ICC in Spanish) to determine which homes would finally receive the assistance as laid out in the plan. The IT services of the Bank of Social Provision (BPS) took on the task of applying the ICC and determining which homes would be eligible.

Despite the role played by university experts, the political logic was decisive in the policy process. At least three fundamental decisions were not technical but political. First, the PANES program targeted the bottom 20% of households below the poverty line (that is, around 8% of the population). This decision was adopted before the intervention of UDELAR’s poverty experts, following strictly political criteria (Rius 2012). Second, the selection mechanism of assisted households based on the ICC was also politically influenced. MIDES authorities made the initial inclusion criteria more flexible so as to not delay the plan (as delaying it would have had a high political cost), and solicited the modification of the index to include more households.⁶ Third, the decision to suspend PANES was also imminently political. The FA

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⁵ One of these two experiences of cooperation, of which the Instituto de Economía of the FCEyA was a key actor, was distinguished with an international award as best collaborative practice between research and policy (PEGnet Best Practice Award 2009).

⁶ The testimony of Juan Pablo Labat, current National Director of Evaluation and Monitoring of the MIDES and advisor to the Subsecretary of this ministry during the implementation of PANES, is quite revealing: “In the face of the negative classification of a large part of homes visited in the first part of fieldwork, the authorities decided to conditionally include all homes that met one of the criteria considered, which was to present a per capita level of income declared below a previously established value. (...) The many setbacks that happened during this time, which was seen by the whole political system as a substantial indicator of how the government was functioning, pressured the ministry authorities in such a way that they preferred to leave the verification of said process to a later date, immediately integrating these homes to the plan” (2012:69-71).
could not come to the political campaign admitting that the social emergency continued. In 2007 the PANES was replaced with the Equality Plan.  

2.1.b The case and the concepts

On a theoretical level, the study of PANES suggests the following conclusions:

- First, even though the government adopted a popular paradigm (CCT) in the region, it relied on the UDELAR, a university institution in which the FA has profound roots and enjoys strong loyalties, to adapt and implement the plan.

- Second, although academics played a very important role in determining the policy, the political rationality was present the entire time in fundamental decisions:
  1. In the creation of the MIDES: the president had to provide a clear signal to leftist voters
  2. In the designation of its authorities: the president had to include the Communist Party in the cabinet (Garcé 2006:7)
  3. In the decision to take PANES forward: the president knew that the execution of this plan, like in other countries, could allow him to increase the FA’s political capital
  4. In the timing of PANES: this policy had to start in the first semester of the first year of government and could not last for more than two years
  5. In the quantitative definition of the target public: that the plan would have two hundred thousand beneficiaries was defined politically (and not technically)
  6. In the adjustment of the eligibility criteria: in order to achieve the previous political objective

- Third, State structures contributed to the rapid implementation of this policy. The MIDES was built around it. There was not and there could not be path dependence. The

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7 In the list of the gap between design and implementation it is necessary to also mention that the conditions in education and health demanded by experts and financial backers (in this case the IADB) were not controlled, as the MIDES authorities admitted later on (Amarente and Vigorito 2012: 23). In this case, it is possible that the breach is not explained by political reasons but by a lack of institutional capacity in the State to demand the meeting of said conditions.
existence of important levels of technical capacity in the BPS, at the same time, permitted the application of the ICC and delimitation of the target public.

2.2 The creation of the National Agency for Research and Innovation

In 2006, Parliament passed legislation proposed by the Executive for the creation of the National Agency for Research and Innovation (ANII). It is impossible to understand this institutional innovation, a milestone for innovative policy in Uruguay, without first taking into account the work done by the scientific community in the years prior to the FA’s victory. Here President Vázquez again looked to keep one of his promises: during the campaign, he produced the slogan “Innovative Uruguay” in order to emphasize the importance that his government would place on innovation, science, and technology. The specific proposal to create an agency was not one of the measures included in his electoral platform. However, it was part of an array of recommendations formulated and widely disseminated by experts later in 2003 and 2004.

2.2.a The problem, the alternative, the opportunity and the outcome

Problems stream: Uruguay never had very sophisticated innovation policies. For many years it developed its national industry under the protection of mechanisms adopted within the import substitution industrialization (ISI) framework predominant in Latin America (a multiple exchange rate, in the thirties and forties; tariff, fiscal, and credit instruments in the fifties, sixties and seventies). Before the authoritarian regime (1973-1984), the university, for its part, also did not have a policy of cooperation with the business sector. On the contrary, the country’s most active sectors prioritized alliances with workers as part of a larger project of global transformation of society to be anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist. At the beginning of the 1970s several policies began to take shape and the National Council of Scientific and Technological Innovations was created (CONICYT). However, it would not be until after the dictatorship that more energetic policies would appear in this sector. In 1985 the Plan for the Development of Basic Sciences (PREDECIBA) was created, and in 1989 so was the Faculty of Sciences.

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8 The main government measures promised by Vázquez during the “responsible transition” cycle (July-October 2004) can still be read in the Presidency web page. The leftist candidate synthesized the programmatic proposal in six axes: Social Uruguay, Productive Uruguay, Innovative Uruguay, Democratic Uruguay, Integrated Uruguay and Cultural Uruguay. See: http://archivo.presidencia.gub.uy/_web/pages/vazquez03.htm

9 The PEDECIBA was established in 1995 as a permanent program in the national budget law of 1995 (Law 16,736, articles 386 and 387). It includes the following areas: biology, information technology, mathematics, and chemistry.
UDELAR, in the meantime, began to develop policies to link innovation processes in the university with the requirements of entrepreneurial innovation, inspired by the “Triple Helix” approach. All of these innovations had as a key actor the national scientific community, essentially researchers from UDELAR. Still more progress is made in the decade that follows, up until the 1999-2002 crisis. Among these advances are some relevant institutional changes (like the reconfiguration of the National Institute of Agricultural and Livestock Research and the creation of the National Directorate of Science and Technology within the Ministry of Education and Culture) and an increase in support for research (such as more funding through contests and the creation of the National Fund for Researchers). However, it was only after the 1999-2002 economic fiasco that the state of the country was fully assessed and that the public agenda included the need for a more vigorous policy of innovation (Davyt 2011:112-113). The year 2003, in this sense, was fundamental. In the framework of a project called CIÉNTIS, backed by FESUR and led by FA Senator Enrique Rubio (then president of the Senate’s Commission for Science and Technology), almost 300 people, among them academics, politician, and experts in innovation, participated in seminars and other exchanges over the course of the year to put together a development plan for science, technology, and innovation. The final document had a strong impact on public opinion (Davyt 2011:115). Political parties incorporated these demands into their programs heading into the 2004 elections.

Policy stream. The most important document in this context was produced by a group of researchers from UDELAR under the direction of the then Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences of UDELAR, Luis Bértola. This text was prepared through a series of consultancies commissioned by the IADB in order to offer technical tools to the new government. The country, according to this team, was in an “innovative indigence”: low spending on innovation and development, a lack of researchers, a weak demand for innovation, supply concentrated in the public sector, problems in articulating supply and demand, etc. (Bértola et al 2005:II). “Innovative indigence”, according to this diagnosis, was to blame for the lack of dynamism in the national economy over the long term. In order to overcome these obstacles three objectives were proposed: i) innovative culture: transforming social attitudes by stimulating and incentivizing innovation as part of a strategic plan for innovation, science, and technology; ii) linking the actors of the system by reforming the institutional design in a way allowing the

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10 The basics of this approach can be consulted at http://www.triplehelixconference.org/the-triple-helix-concept.html
coordination of public policy; and iii) an increase in the quantity and quality of human resources. The institutional overhaul proposed included, among other initiatives, the creation of an Innovation Cabinet (made up of some ministers and other high functionaries from the innovation system) and the creation of a National Agency for the Development of Scientific and Technological Research and Innovation. A key point in the proposal was its relative autonomy with respect to the national scientific community. In other words, the institutional makeup empowered government officials, and not the scientists, to define policies. The Innovation Cabinet was charged with coordinating area policy. The Agency, meanwhile, would evaluate, select, and finance activities to be carried out within the framework of the defined plans. The proposal to create an Agency was not a total novelty, though. Similar ideas had already been discussed since the late nineties by some of UDELAR’s most respected experts in innovation, like Rodrigo Arocena and Judith Sutz (Davyt 2011:109). The CIENTIS document had also called for a “new institutional architecture” (2003:19).

**Political stream.** The policy window in the area of innovation ended when the FA won the 2004 election. The change in government generated favorable political conditions for two reasons. The first has to do with presidential leadership. Tabaré Vázquez really prioritized the issue of innovation. Also in this case, as in PANES, there was a convergence of ideas and interests. On one hand, like the vast majority of the national political elite following the economic and social debacle of 1999-2000, Vázquez sincerely believed in the importance of innovation. On the other, he had to adopt ambitious measures in the fields of innovation, science, and technology to compensate for other decisions of his, like naming Danilo Astori as Minister of Economy. Many of his voters considered the economic proposals that Astori had been defending since his election to the Senate in 1995 as distant from the FA tradition and as too like the neoliberal policies promoted by other parties. The second reason had to do with the close link between the FA and the academic world. With the change in government, for the first time in decades there was a political party with deep roots in the scientific community in general and in UDELAR in particular. We cannot know what would’ve happened if the FA had not won the election. It is very likely that any other party also would have tried to move forward with the recommendations of the CIENTIS project and the Bértola report. But it is very hard to create change and implement new policies without the support of those social sectors that are directly interested in change.
Outcome. According to the Kingdon model that I have used so far, there is no pre-established sequence between the problem, the alternatives, and political viability. Sometimes there is political leadership and the problem is part of the agenda, but there are no solutions available on the technical level. Other times there are viable solutions, but the problem is not part of the agenda, or there are no political conditions to take them forward. Some of this occurred in the case that I am studying. The proposal to create a specialized state agency to implement innovation policies within the framework of priorities established by the government was born nearly a decade after the problem of “innovative indigence”, in general, and the need for institutional change in particular, were prioritized by the political system. The economic crisis on one hand, and the looming change in government, in the other, generated a strong incentive for academics to make their demands public for a true policy for innovation, science, and technology. Vázquez gathered these demands during the campaign and incorporated them to his political platform. Once elected, following the recommendations of the Bértola report (Bértola et al 2005), he convened the Ministerial Cabinet for Innovation. The MCI then created an Operative Team to prepare a Strategic Plan. The same team wrote the bill for the creation of the National Agency for Research and Innovation (ANII) that was sent to Parliament in August 2006 and approved in December of that same year (Rubianes 2013:13).

2.2.b The case and the concepts

On the theoretical level, the process of creation of the ANII suggests the following conclusions:

- First, the participation of the national scientific community and UDELAR researchers is very visible in the process of “social construction” of the problem of innovation and elaboration of alternatives.

- Second, the case clearly shows that, as sophisticated as a problem may be, when it is understood by the public opinion it tends to be incorporated by the political actors and prioritized in their electoral platforms and government agendas. The worst crises, seen from this angle, can offer the best opportunities.

- Third, it is evident than when an issue firmly places itself in the public agenda, it is possible that political competition does not inhibit consensus. In other words, even in very competitive political systems like that of Uruguay, specialized knowledge can create consensus.
Fourth, the case shows that international cooperation can play a very relevant role in the dynamics of ideas. FESUR’s support for the CIENTIS project was fundamental to integrating the issue in public opinion and to influencing the processes of party programming. The support of the IADB also made possible some of the proposals for innovation policy that had been formulated in the nineties. When Tabaré Vázquez began his presidency, he had a very detailed proposal for the institutional reengineering of the National System of Innovation thanks to this support. In conclusion: the more concrete a proposal of change based in research is, the more likely it is to be used in public policy.

2.3 The failure of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States

President Vázquez, with the support of the powerful network of economists that had control over economic policy, launched a free trade agreement with the United States between 2005 and 2006. The creation of a large opposing coalition made up of political sectors of the FA, union actors, leftist intellectuals and university students blocked the presidential initiative. Two networks of experts clashed, presenting different empirical evidence and knowledge. In the long run, it was not empirical evidence but, once again, presidential calculations that ended up tipping the scale and determining the outcome.

2.2.b The problem, the alternative, the opportunity and the outcome

Problems stream. Uruguay, like other Latin American countries, had very high levels of protectionism throughout the 20th century. The country first began to see protectionism as a problem in the mid-1950s, when a long process of stagflation began. Little by little a different approach began to emerge, urged on by major neoliberal thinkers in Uruguay like Ramon Díaz, who argued early on that a “small country must be an open country.” Commercial aperture as a paradigm first appeared at the beginning of the 1970s, but was gradually carried out. An important turning point was the country’s entrance into MERCOSUR (1991). During almost a decade, there was virtual political and academic consensus on this pattern of international integration, which was defined as “open regionalism” (regional integration as a platform for commercial relations with the rest of the world). The 1999-2000 crisis broke this consensus. The Uruguayan economy plummeted when both Brazilian (due to the devaluation of 1999) and Argentinean (due to the financial crisis of 2001) demand reduced drastically. The regional shock was compounded by an increasingly important body of academic thought that saw Uruguay’s low capacity to prevent negative external shock as the main obstacle long-term
growth. Vázquez’s economic team, made up of prestigious, highly-trained economists, was very conscious of this problem.

**Policy stream.** In the middle of the 2002 crisis, when the entire country was discussing the problem of how to obtain pensioners’ money that was stuck in banks that had gone bust, President Jorge Batlle said something that had a considerable impact on public opinion. He said that the worst “corralito”, or trap, the most dangerous one for Uruguay, was MERCOSUR. This point of view was shared by the majority of economists from the various parties. The alternative to “open regionalism” (the pattern of commercial integration that had led to the 2002 catastrophe) that began to gain legitimacy was commercial integration “Chilean style”, that is, to build more bilateral free trade agreements. The FTA with Mexico, negotiated and finalized by President Batlle himself, contributed to promulgating the potential of this alternative. Batlle began moving in the direction of a free trade agreement. He managed to obtain a Bilateral Treaty for Investment (Porzecanski 2010). Vázquez’s principle economists were partial to this alternative, as was seen when the United States made clear that they were willing to pursue an FTA with Uruguay.

**Political stream.** The policy window for this innovation was formed by 2005. President Vázquez announced his support for Danilo Astori’s initiative to sign an FTA with the United States. Vázquez, a doctor by profession, does not necessarily have very deep convictions about the matter of economic integration. In reality, he only favored the FTA because doing so demonstrated his faith trust in Astori – his favorite minister – and his technical capacity. In addition, like Astori, he had come to the conclusion that Uruguay had to adopt the Chilean insertion strategy (Porzecanski 2010: 120-122). Vázquez also, in this decision as in others, looked to Chile’s President Ricardo Lagos as a model of leadership. As Porzecanski pointed out, Lagos left the presidency with a 60% approval rating after having signed an FTA with the U.S. in 2003 (2010:124). Furthermore, the political conditions could not have been better. Both Vázquez and Astori enjoyed extraordinarily high levels of popularity. Second, the majority of the public opinion was in favor of the FTA (Porzecanski 2010: 130). Third, even though Vázquez knew that the proposal would generate resistance within his party, he trusted in his ability to overcome it. In fact, he had done so several times on several important subjects, like the surprising and unilateral decision, announced in the middle of the campaign (July 2004), to designate Astori as Minister of Economics should he win the presidency. Finally, opposition parties were clearly in favor of the FTA. The political opportunity could not be clearer.
Outcome. The FTA attempt failed. The proposal had generated large veto coalition within the left. This coalition was made up of important actors: some ministers (among them the Foreign Affairs Minister, Reinaldo Gargano), factions of the FA (including Jose Mujica’s faction, which had the most votes in the 2004 election), the syndicate movement, and a powerful network of leftist intellectuals specialized in innovation. This network, a true epistemic community made up mostly of researchers from the University of the Republic, played a very important role in the formulation and dissemination of a modern argument against free commerce. The spokespersons for this network maintained that, even though FTAs can favor economic growth in the short term, in the long term they end up working against development in the sense that they inhibit innovation. This argument was much more compatible with the leftist tradition, linked to proposals from ECLAC since the sixties, than with proponents of the FTA with the U.S. (easily identifiable as “neoliberal”). Vázquez had to take a step back to save his leadership within the left. In terms of political survival his decision was correct: one of the main reasons why Danilo Astori was defeated by Jose Mujica in the primary election for Vázquez’s successor as candidate to the presidency in July 2009 was, precisely, for having promoted the FTA with the United States.

2.2.b The case and the concepts
At the theoretical level, we can draw some conclusions from the failed attempt to create an FTA with the United States:

- First, the case highlights once again the centrality of academic institutions, and in particular UDELAR, in Uruguay’s KR. University students played a key role in both sides of the conflict: in the advocacy coalition that promoted the FTA with the U.S. and in the opposition coalition that blocked it.

- Second, the case shows the preponderance of partisan knowledge and adversarial logic. Both sides presented theoretical arguments and empirical knowledge.

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An epistemic community is a network of experts that share beliefs and values about the problems and challenges in a determined area of policy. The developmental epistemic community was made up of, among others, engineers, experts in development, economists, historians, sociologists, and political scientists. The majority of these are UDELAR researchers.
• Third, it demonstrates the pluralism of the Uruguayan policymaking regime: not even the most politically powerful president Uruguay has had could carry out his will.

• Fourth, it reminds us of the technical weakness of State structures in Uruguay. During the debate, not a single public administration agency played a relevant role, not even the Foreign Affairs Office.

• Fifth, it emphasizes the centrality of parties and the importance of their ideologies. The most politically powerful technical arguments ended up being those best adapted to ideological traditions in the government party.

• Sixth, this example supports the hypothesis of the primacy of political calculation. Vázquez ended up taking a step back. It was evident that he did not have enough support within the FA and that, if he were to persevere, he could end up paying an important political cost in terms of his own leadership in the FA.

2.4 Similarities and differences in the three events of change analysed

The following table summarizes the analyzed information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems stream</th>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the “social construction” of each of the three problems, academic institutions and university networks played a central role.</td>
<td>Both in the case of the identification of the problem of “innovative indigence” as in the vulnerabilities of “open regionalism”, UDELAR’s academic networks played a decisive role. However, in the “social construction” of the poverty problem IPES of UCUDAL played a very important role.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy stream</th>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universities (public or private) and their researchers were also fundamental in the elaboration and/or implementation of innovations. UDELAR’s academics were the protagonists amassing research on innovation that led to the creation of the ANII, both in the implementation of PANES and in the theoretical argument for vetoing the FTA.</td>
<td>Important differences are registered in the degree of domestic elaboration of the policy alternatives. In the PANES case, a very popular model in the region according to a classic pattern of policy diffusion was imported. In the case of ANII, the domestic accumulation of knowledge seems to be much more consistent and decisive. There are also differences in the types of knowledge employed. In the case of...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political-Knowledge Regimes.
### Political stream

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Some transnational institutions (like the IADB and the Edbert Foundation) helped to elaborate or implement these innovations.</strong></td>
<td><strong>ANII the accumulation of preexisting research contributed to create consensus. In the case of the FTA, research had an adversative dynamic, being both against and in favor of the presidential initiative.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The change of incumbent party was decisive in the configuration of each policy window.</strong></td>
<td><strong>In the two successful cases the president had very strong political convictions and commitments. He had been promising an “emergency plan” since the 1999 electoral campaign.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential leadership was key both for driving the three changes as for stopping one of them (the FTA).</strong></td>
<td><strong>President Vázquez made innovation one of the cornerstones of his electoral platform in 2004. However, during the failure of the FTA he held no convictions or strong political commitments.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In order to understand the dynamic of the three events it is essential to take into account the strategic considerations of the president (expected political costs and benefits).</strong></td>
<td><strong>The pluralism of the policymaking regime did not prevent change in two of the three events studied.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### 3. Towards a new concept

In this section I will argue why the analysis of these three changes in public policy helps to show the limitations of the KR concept. It clearly shows the importance of further studying the demand side, absent in KR. Furthermore, it shows that the dynamic of social research does not depend so much on political economy factors highlighted by Campbell and Pedersen. If that were the case, the Uruguayan KR would be similar to Germany’s in the sense that they present the same variety of capitalism (coordinated) and the same type of policymaking regime (pluralist). However, Uruguay is more akin to the United States than Germany. This observation opens the way towards the creation of a new concept.

#### 3.1 The demand for research and its protagonists as decisive factors

The KR concept leaves demand for knowledge out of focus. This is a big problem, as the three processes analyzed show that demand is a decisive factor in the use of social research. There is no way of understanding the adoption of the conditional cash transfer model (PANES), the creation of ANII, and the unexpected failure of the FTA with the United States without looking at the role played by presidential leadership. In order to explain the motivation for the three reforms and the halt of the FTA we have to take into account the strategic calculations of the president. In terms of political capital, he had much to win by promoting the PANES and the
ANII, and much to risk (and eventually, to lose) persevering in the promotion of the FTA after the powerful veto coalition – made up, of factions of his own party, union leaders, businessmen, and university students – was formed.

There is no way to understand the research dynamic in the three cases without taking into account the ideological and institutional characteristics of the FA, and its link to university networks. From the ideological point of view, as a good leftist party, the FA shows a clearly values equality. The quick adoption of PANES is a direct consequence of this tradition. The FA’s anti-imperialism, at the same time, contributes to failure of the FTA with the United States. The party’s schism over the issue is a fundamental institutional factor for understanding why the president had to abandon the FTA. Finally, recognizing the FA’s roots in UDELAR is crucial to understanding why the FA government managed to feed so easily off of the contributions of university networks that are form the base of innovations achieved (PANES and ANII).

The KR concept is a great contribution, but it does not illuminate a central dimension of the dynamic of specialized knowledge. The demand for research and its protagonists (officials and political parties) are left to the side. To understand how any market works, including the market of ideas, we must focus on the characteristics of both supply and demand. Who demands social research, when adopting (or legitimizing) decisions and public policy? The answer is obvious: it is the government ranks, made up of elected politicians. In order to understand the demand for social research, we must further study political actors and the political institutions in which they operate.

### 3.2 Uruguay should be similar to Germany... but it is similar to the United States

The KR concept has an additional problem. According to Campbell and Pedersen, Uruguay should be like Germany in the sense that it presents the same variety of capitalism (coordinated) and the same type of policymaking regime (pluralist). According to these authors, the combination of decentralized policymaking regime and coordinated capitalism generates a consensus-oriented knowledge regime. In these cases, the market of ideas should be relatively uncompetitive, with few RU oriented towards advocacy. The knowledge generated should be oriented to build consensus and be perceived by society as neutral. None of this occurs in Uruguay.
It is true that in Germany there are a few RU oriented towards advocacy. As it was made clear when the policy changes of the Vázquez government were examined, the RU that form part of the university system, in general, and those of UDELAR in particular, play a central role in the policy process. But specialized knowledge, even the most decidedly neutral, ends up being widely used by parties (and their factions) in the battle for political power. Technical rationality is firmly subordinated to political rationality. This was also clear in the three cases analyzed.

When formulating government programs parties call the experts. But, in general, they call their own experts, those that let themselves be labeled by the public as trusted advisers of a particular leader or party. It is a risky step for experts: they lose legitimacy in the eyes of one part of society in exchange for the promise of influence. Once they are in government, parties once again call on the experts. But they do not call just anyone. They also do not call those who have the best academic credentials or the best technical profile for the job. Once more, they call the experts that have earned political trust. Academic merit, specific training, and mastery of the issue matter less than political trust, party trajectory, and demonstrations of loyalty to the party leader.

The dynamic of specialized knowledge in Uruguay is in fact more like the United States than Germany. As in the U.S., specialized knowledge is a formidable weapon in the war for power. The big difference between both countries is that while in the U.S. the main actors are interest groups, who wage their battles for influence through think tanks, in Uruguay political parties are given the central role. The variety of capitalism does not provide any relevant difference to understand what matters the most in the social research dynamic. It is certainly true that the research supply in the U.S., derived from private RUs, is very different from that in Uruguay, where a university network predominates. Nevertheless, the dynamic is the same: in the two countries competition for influence ends up being so fierce that knowledge becomes a weapon in the hands of the contending actors. In reality, in order to understand the type of specialized knowledge and its political dynamic, it is not so important to understand how the economic market is regulated (or not), but to decipher what are the factors that structure the political market.

3.3 The missing dimension: the status of science in each society

Uruguay, the United States, and Germany each have pluralist policymaking regimes. But while in the first two countries there is an open knowledge market and the use of adversarial and
partisan research is prevalent, in Germany the predominant type and use of knowledge is very different. Why is Uruguay similar to the U.S. and not to Germany? In this section we will argue that the crucial difference must be found in the social valuation of social research. Campbell and Pedersen argue that the existence of a coordinated economy generates knowledge oriented towards consensus. There are good reasons to argue that it is exactly backwards. If a society has admitted that scientific knowledge has special status, it will probably consider it legitimate that consensus be built on public policy through scientific research. That is why it will most likely generate institutions capable of producing this knowledge to “rationally” regulate the market.

Let’s look at other countries using this lens. France, for example, is not very different from Germany. Since the Enlightenment, the French have also placed great trust in science and the “light” of reason. It isn’t a coincidence that in France after the Second World War, indicative planning has developed so much or that is the country now leads the world in prospective studies. France is a technocratic country in which scientific knowledge is synonymous with the common good. If my interpretation is correct, a scientific knowledge with pretensions of neutrality didn’t develop because there is a coordinated market economy. It is likely that it was the other way around, that is, that after the Second World War strong planning offices could be implemented and that strong state structures developed geared towards “rationalizing” the economy because French culture places enormous trust in the role of science.

The Latin American country most like Germany and France from the point of view of the social status of scientific knowledge is Chile. Technocrats, as Patricio Silva would argue, have played a fundamental role in Chile’s government at least since the middle of the 19th century. As in other countries of Latin America (Brazil and Mexico are excellent examples), positivism encouraged the first technocratic turn. From Pablo Ramirez and his “boys”, to the economists of the Concertación, to the Chicago Boys during Pinochet’s rule, experts have played a central role in the Chilean government and in public policy.

Not only do state structures tend to reflect the degree of confidence of society in science, but political parties, to the extent that they express predominant values, tend to reproduce these patterns. The more enlighten a society is, the more reverence political parties will have for intellectuals and the more they will trust in the social utility and neutrality of science. However, the more anti-intellectual it is, the more intensely political parties give an instrumental use to specialized knowledge.
3.4 Creating a new concept: Political knowledge regimes

The policymaking regime helps us understand the dynamic of social research. Pluralism facilitates the formation of an open market and an adversarial use. But it is not enough. Some countries have the same type of policymaking regime and notorious differences in the dynamic of research. The discussion in the previous section suggest that in order to take these differences into consideration we must put aside the variety of capitalism and incorporate a variable that does not appear in Campbell and Pedersen’s discussion: the degree of confidence in the power of reason and science in each society.

I will call the concept built from the policymaking regime and the social valuation of science the Political-Knowledge Regime. The policymaking regime strongly influences both the characteristics of the supply as well as those of the demand of research. As Campbell and Pedersen have shown, a pluralist policymaking regime favors the formation of an open market of ideas and an intense competition between different bodies of knowledge. Meanwhile, a centralized policymaking regime generates a more closed market of ideas. The social valuation of science also profoundly affects the supply and the demand of research. In countries where a more rationalist culture predominates, the demand for research tends to be more intense and recognizes that science can be neutral. In countries characterized by political cultures that are skeptical of expert knowledge, there will be less demand for scientific knowledge and knowledge will not be used as a tool toward political ends.

From these variables we can draw the following typology:

**Typology of Political Knowledge Regimes**

| General valuation of knowledge (Predominant traditional culture) |
|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Rationalism           | Pragmatism          |
| Enlightenment         | Anti-intellectualism|
It must be made clear, before we move on, that in this discussion a normative bias must not be looked for. This clarification having been made, let us look at each of the quadrants.

- **TYPE I. TECHNOCRACY.** The combination of centralization and rationalism generates the intense use of social research by the state. Political parties appeal frequently to experts and tend to delegate important responsibilities in the definition of public policy. Academic knowledge is very important as a stepping stone for political careers and it is a *sine qua non* condition to occupy positions in government. A clear example of this type in our region is Chile, which seems to have inherited from the German influence a high valuation for science.

- **TYPE II. TECHNOCRATIC PLURALISM.** The combination of pluralism and rationalism generates an open market of ideas in which alternate political paradigms compete. The high valuation of science generates an important development of social science and of research applied to public policy. As in type I (technocracy), there are state structures that favor the use of knowledge in policy. University training and academic merit are important for government positions. Brazil is a good example.

- **TYPE III. PLEBEIAN MAJORITY.** The combination of centralization and anti-intellectualism does not foster the formation of an open and demanding market of ideas. The use of research, in any case, does not have to be low. But it is strictly subordinate to strategic politics of predominant actors that appeal fundamentally to legitimizing decisions and impose their hegemony. An example of this type could be Argentina.

- **TYPE IV. PLEBEIAN PLURALISM.** The combination of pluralism and anti-intellectualism generates a comparatively low and essentially instrumentalist use of specialized knowledge in public policy. Pluralism favors the formation of an open and competitive market of ideas. But politics prevails clearly over technical rationality. Specialized knowledge is, in essence, a weapon in the fight for power among the main political actors. State structures, like in Type III (plebeian majority), clearly show the predominance of political rationality. Uruguay is a good example of this type.

The following table summarizes the characteristics of each of the PKR proposed:

**Typology of Political Knowledge Regimes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand from the political system</th>
<th>Technocracy</th>
<th>Technocratic Pluralism</th>
<th>Plebeian Majority</th>
<th>Plebeian Pluralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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It appears that the page includes a table comparing the demand from the political system across different types of political knowledge regimes. The table is structured with columns for Technocracy, Technocratic Pluralism, Plebeian Majority, and Plebeian Pluralism. The rows are labeled with Demand from the political system and have corresponding values (High, High, Medium, Low).
### Table: Use of research and Market of ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of research</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Instrumental</th>
<th>Instrumental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market of ideas</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. Conclusion: opportunities and limitations of the proposed concept

It is likely that the critique of Campbell and Pedersen’s KR typology presented in this article is persuasive. However, I cannot help but ask myself if the new concept does not have limitations as serious as or more serious than the previous one. In fact, it is much easier to question an existing concept, manifesting that it does not explain some specific cases, than to build a new and better one.

It is clear that to not focus on the demand side and to not study political structures are important deficiencies of the Knowledge Regimes concept proposed by Campbell and Pedersen. The Uruguayan case study, furthermore, suggests that the combination of variables which the aforementioned authors use to define the type of RU’s that exist in each country and of the use of knowledge in each KR presents serious problems (Uruguay definitely does not resemble Germany). The concept proposed here intends to correct these problems and to give the demand for research and political actors and structures a much more important role. It also incorporates a novel variable, the social valuation of science, as an explanatory factor in the role of research in public policy.

It is, of course, a first attempt at conceptual construction. It is due, therefore, to be widely debated, both from the point of view of its internal logic as well as in terms of its capacity to describe and explain national cases. From a theoretical point of view, the same critiques to any other effort in generalization apply. First, it is not easy to define the policymaking regime of a country, or its predominant discourse on reason and science. As with any time there is such a high level of abstraction in a discussion, the following question is inevitable: aren’t there, within the same country, relevant territorial or sectorial differences? Second, like in the concept of Knowledge Regimes from which it derives, it is too static. As it might have been noticed, the time factor has not been incorporated into this study: wouldn’t it be possible to find empirical
evidence of important processes of change in any of the two variables that make up the Political-Knowledge Regime?

It is clear that the only way to value the specific contribution that the new typology could make is by trying to apply it in different contexts. In doing so, we could probably try and answer another key question: to what extent does the type of PKR help in understanding the differences that usually exist, from the point of view of the use of research, in the successive moments of the policymaking process? It seems logical to posit, for example, that in technocratic countries like Chile, specialized knowledge has a deeper and more direct impact on the implementation state that in countries of “plebeian pluralism” like Uruguay. I hope that this text inspires new empirical research on the structural factors that influence the dynamic of social research, and mobilizes a theoretical debate to which Campbell and Pedersen have left an especially valuable and stimulating contribution.
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